A rejoinder to an undated, untitled message circulated by Suleman Ndanusa, with project comparisons attributed to Meta AI.
By Tanimu Yakubu
Corruption takes money from public works and leaves people to bear the loss. Nigeria cannot afford it. But a charge this serious must rest on sound evidence.
The comparisons between Lagos and Ethiopia do not yet provide it. They mix the cost of a whole railway with the passengers carried on part of it.
They treat different contractors as one company. They quote freight charges without the distance to which those charges apply. They then turn these weaknesses into a firm verdict.
We should demand the accounts. We should also get the comparison right.
Correcting a faulty argument gives no government a certificate of good spending.
What Lagos and Addis Ababa actually bought
Lagos’s Blue Line was built by CCECC. Addis Ababa’s light rail was built by CREC. They are separate Chinese companies. The claim that the same contractor built both was wrong. [1, 2] LAMATA’s reported explanation puts the whole 27-kilometre Blue Line at $1.17 billion, including trains and a maintenance depot.
About 13 kilometres, from Marina to Mile 2, are in service. The rest remains under development. The full project cost and the traffic on the opened section must be identified separately. The agency’s explanation also needs published accounts behind it. [3, 4] On those figures, Lagos costs about $43.3 million per route-kilometre.
Ethiopia’s railway corporation gives a cost of $475 million and a length of about 34 kilometres, or roughly $14 million per kilometre. Shared track on the Addis network needs to be accounted for when measuring its length. Neither ratio adjusts for price dates or scope. [2, 3] Lagos still looks dearer. That is a reason to examine the difference closely.
We need the quantities of elevated and surface track, the foundations, bridges and stations. We need to know what each total includes for land, trains, power, signalling and depots. We need the contract dates, variations, taxes and financing charges. Difficult ground may raise a price. It cannot explain any price put before us. An engineer must show the quantities. An auditor must follow the payments. Any remaining premium must be explained.
The years lost
Fourteen years against three and a half is a grave delivery gap. People paid for it in lost hours, high fares and journeys that wore them down. But calendar years alone cannot tell us how efficiently a contractor worked. Was funding available? Was the land clear? Did work stop? Did the design change? Who made the decisions, and what did they cost? These questions establish responsibility. They do not excuse delay. Corruption, poor preparation, interrupted funding and weak supervision can all damage a project. We should establish what happened and deal with it.
What the passenger numbers can tell us
There is no sound calculation that turns a cost ratio into 250,000 daily passengers. Nor does a budget of $6 billion, by itself, produce one million daily commuters. Trains need passengers who can reach the stations, afford the fare and get to their destinations. They need enough service at the hours people travel. More track and more trains help only when the service fits those needs.
In September 2026, LAMATA reported more than nine million passenger journeys in three years. Daily train trips had risen from 12 to about 94. That shows service growth. It does not settle whether the investment is being used well. Nine million journeys also does not mean nine million different passengers. [5] Publish the monthly figures. Show boardings, distances travelled, occupied seats and standing space, cancellations and subsidy. Show what capacity stands idle and why. Measure the whole commute. A fast ride between two stations can still leave a long walk, an expensive bus connection or a poor journey home.
Fares need the same care. A cheap ticket may be supported by subsidy. A higher ticket may reflect costs that another government pays elsewhere. The claim that Lagos fares could be cut by 50–75 per cent needs an operating account to support it.
What Ethiopia teaches
Ethiopia’s lower reported construction cost deserves serious study. So do the problems that followed. A World Bank assessment records missed ridership forecasts, inadequate power, shortages of spare parts and debt-service difficulties on the Addis light rail. It describes an earlier period, not a complete account of today’s service. Its lesson remains useful: a railway can be built and still struggle to serve its city. [6] Nigeria should learn how Ethiopia built more cheaply. It should learn how to keep the trains running after the builders leave.
A highway and a freight railway
The coastal highway and the Addis–Djibouti railway are similar in length. Their work, their designs and their costs are different. A road’s price depends on its lanes, pavement, bridges, drainage, land and ground conditions. A railway’s price depends on its tracks, gradients, structures, power, signalling, trains and terminals.
There is no rule that an electrified railway must cost more than a concrete road. Even the arithmetic in the criticism needs repair. $11 billion over 750 kilometres gives about $14.7 million per kilometre. $4.5 billion over 756 kilometres gives about $6 million. These differ from the figures quoted. Recent reports attribute to the Works Minister the position that the coastal highway is being designed and costed in sections, and that its full cost remains undetermined. That does not permit us to call $11 billion a settled final cost.
It does require government to publish the engineering plan, the price of each section and the commitments needed to finish the corridor. [7, 8] We can compare road and rail as choices for public spending. We should ask which combination moves people and goods best, at a cost the country can carry. A coastal road may serve coastal towns, trade and industry. Its case must be made on those benefits. It need not be the main route for northern food traffic to have value. But government must show what it will deliver and why it deserves priority over other needs.
Freight costs need a distance
Djibouti’s ports authority reports a reduction in the journey to Addis Ababa from three days by road to about 12 hours by rail. It also describes direct port-terminal connections. Those are valuable gains. They are not the full time needed to clear goods and deliver them to a customer. [9] The quoted ₦31–₦62 per tonne has no useful meaning without a distance and an exchange-rate date. The Global Infrastructure Hub records temporary charges of US$0.023 per tonne-kilometre for exports and US$0.046 for imports. The distance must be multiplied by that charge. A rate for one kilometre is not a rate for the whole journey.
[10] Ethiopia has also developed refrigerated logistics. That takes more than a railway. The European Commission describes a cold-storage project at Modjo Dry Port linked to the line. Cold stores, refrigerated containers, power and dependable handling all have to work together. Nigeria will need the same practical arrangements if rail is to preserve farm produce and reduce losses. [11]
Make the railway earn its place
Nigeria is rebuilding a railway that suffered deep decay. Calling it dead conveys the damage, though it had not vanished entirely. We must renew the assets, train the workforce, protect the service and persuade customers that it can be trusted.
There are assets to build on. NRC runs Lagos–Ibadan, Abuja–Kaduna and Warri–Itakpe services. Federal reports also record standard-gauge container traffic between Apapa and Moniya. These services should carry more useful traffic and account openly for their cost. [12, 13] The next gains depend on connections. Ports need working rail access. Freight yards need reliable onward delivery. Farms need collection and storage. Where gauges differ, cargo needs a transfer arrangement that does not consume the saving made on the railway.
The budget should follow those needs. Complete connections with credible traffic. Keep locomotives and wagons available. Pay for maintenance, spares and security. Secure freight commitments from businesses that will use the service. Examine rehabilitation before assuming every corridor needs a new line. Compare new rail schemes with better buses, repaired roads and usable waterways. Publish what was paid, what was built and what service followed. Every additional naira should help produce a dependable journey or lower the delivered cost of goods. Track length alone cannot tell us whether that happened.
The critic is right to demand better results. The comparisons offered do not prove the corruption alleged. That remains a question for evidence from procurement, engineering and payments. Government must provide that evidence. Inherited decay explains the size of the task. It does not excuse waste.
— Yakubu is Director-General, Budget Office of the Federation
Abuja, 1 November 2026
Sources:
[1] LAMATA and CCECC railway training agreement, 12 July 2026 https://www.lamata-ng.com/2026/07/12/lamata-ccecc-partner-to-establish-railway-training-centre-as-lagos-expands-rail-master- plan-to-11-lines/
[2] Ethiopian Railways Corporation, Addis Ababa Light Rail Transport https://erc.gov.et/project/addis-ababa-light-rail-transport/
[3] TVC News, reported LAMATA cost clarification, 21 May 2026 https://www.tvcnews.tv/lamata-faults-viral-video-claiming-lagos-blue-line-cost-1-2bn/
[4] Nairametrics, Blue Line extension report, 23 October 2026 https://nairametrics.com/2026/10/23/lagos-blue-line-to-extend-to-festac-alakija-trade-fair-by-february-2027/
[5] LAMATA, Three Years On Blue Line Moves 9m Passengers, 5 September 2026 https://www.lamata-ng.com/2026/09/05/three-years-on-blue-line-moves-9m-passengers-in-70000-trips/
[6] World Bank, Mobility and Development periodical assessment https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/099641310012424577/pdf/IDU13fa5b63e12357149b81bfe81f600b99fae83.pdf
[7] THISDAY, Works Minister on undetermined corridor cost, 26 October 2026 https://www.thisdaylive.com/2026/10/26/umahi-cost-of-750km-lagos-calabar-coastal-highway-unknown-alleged-n15tn-value- unfounded/
[8] Arise News, coastal highway designs and costs by section, 23 October 2026 https://www.arise.tv/umahi-there-is-no-single-design-for-entire-750km-lagos-calabar-coastal-highway/
[9] Djibouti Ports and Free Zones Authority, Rail https://www.dpfza.gov.dj/facilities/inland-transport/rail
[10] Global Infrastructure Hub, Addis Ababa Djibouti Railway case study https://www.gihub.org/connectivity-across-borders/case-studies/addis-ababa-djibouti-railway/
[11] European Commission, Cool Port Addis in Ethiopia https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/policies/global-gateway/cool-port-addis-ethiopia_en
[12] Nigerian Railway Corporation, Passenger Services https://nrc.gov.ng/passenger-services/
[13] Federal Ministry of Information, NRC and APM Terminals cargo service https://fmino.gov.ng/nrc-apm-terminals-commence-lagos-ibadan-cargo-rail-service/
Comments